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Nº 356

GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Number 60



CIA/RR MR 59-4

December 1959

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THE STATUS OF THE CARINTHIAN SLOVENES

Introduction

The presence in Austria of a Slavic minority, the Slovenes of Carinthia, has often been an irritant to Yugoslav-Austrian relations. Yugoslavia claimed so-called Slovene Carinthia after World War I and again after World War II but both times was unsuccessful in acquiring this part of Austria. At the end of World War I a plebiscite of the disputed area was held under the auspices of the Paris Peace Conference and the issue was decided in Austria's favor. In spite of the fact that Austria promised to take measures to preserve the ethnic character of the Slavic minority, Yugoslavia was not satisfied with the treatment of the Carinthian Slovenes. After World War II the major Allies (the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, and France) permitted Austria to keep Slovene Carinthia and other small areas demanded by Yugoslavia, and Austria again gave pledges to protect the rights of the Slovenes. The most significant measure taken by Austria in this regard was the establishment of German and Slovene instruction in the schools of the area that was claimed by Yugoslavia (see Map 28344, p. 2).

Yugoslavia had practically no chance of acquiring Austrian territory after World War II. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia persisted in its demands until political circumstances -- estrangement from both East and

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West -- obliged it to renounce the claims. Although Yugoslavia gave up its territorial demands, it by no means abandoned interest in the welfare of the Slavic minority, and the issue became one of whether Austria was fulfilling its self-assumed obligations to the Slovenes.



Compulsory bilingual education in Slovene Carinthia was held by Yugoslavia as the measure most necessary to preserve the ethnic identity of the Slovenes. When, in September 1958, Austria made

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bilingual education voluntary instead of compulsory, Yugoslavia considered the action tantamount to the abolition of the bilingual school system and thus a reversion to a policy of "denationalizing" the Slovenes. Strong protests were registered with the Austrian Government, and meetings then being held with Austria were cancelled as a sign of disapproval. Although the protests in regard to Carinthian schools have diminished in number and vehemence, relations between the two states remain somewhat strained.

The Slovene minority issue is not dead. Inasmuch as political considerations compelled Yugoslavia to give up its territorial claims, it is conceivable that future political developments could bring about a revival of them. For example, were Yugoslavia to rejoin the Soviet Bloc and thereby receive the support of the USSR, it might choose to reopen its claim for Slovene Carinthia.

Background of Problem

The current deterioration of Austrian-Yugoslav relations is but a phase in a long series of difficulties dating back to 1917 when the establishment of the Yugoslav state was proclaimed by a Serbian exile group. The northern boundaries of the new state were to cut across the Austrian province of Carinthia, which had been part of the Hapsburg domain for some 500 years. Whereas Austria made no great effort to retain other territory claimed by Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, it did resist losing any part of Carinthia.

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Consequently, a Commission of the Paris Peace Conference was delegated to examine the issue.

After making an on-the-spot examination of the disputed territory, the Commission established two zones in which plebiscites were to be conducted (see Map 28345, p. 7). If the first zone -- which included the section in the south where the population was decidedly more Slovene than Germanic in composition -- voted to join Yugoslavia, the second zone, or northwestern part of the disputed area, would then vote. If the people of the first zone decided to remain with Austria, however, no further balloting would take place. Therefore, in 1920 when the first plebiscite resulted in a vote of 59.4 percent for Austria, the Yugoslav territorial claim was killed.

The question of the welfare of the Slovenes remained unsolved. During the interwar years, Yugoslavia repeatedly charged that Austria had suppressed the Slovene minority, contrary to the Treaty of St. Germaine and contrary to Austria's own promises before and after the plebiscite. Some of the accusations were undoubtedly true, especially those concerning anti-Slovene measures enforced after the Anschluss in 1938.* During the war years, the plight of the Slovenes (like that of other minorities in Greater Germany) steadily worsened.

* Even though Austria did not exist as a state when it was part of Greater Germany (March 1938 to May 1945), many Yugoslavs still say that Austria shares considerable responsibility for anti-Slovene activities of the Anschluss period.

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At the conclusion of World War II, therefore, it came as no surprise that Yugoslavia, as a partner of the victorious Allies, should claim parts of southern Austria. Initially, Yugoslavia demanded nearly all of Carinthia as well as areas along the southern borders of Styria. Later, claims were reduced to include (1) the 1920 plebiscite area (southern Carinthia), (2) the Gail Valley to the west, and (3) two small districts on the Styrian border (see Map 28345). The total area claimed was slightly less than 1,000 square miles. It included a population of about 180,000, most of whom (according to Yugoslavia) were Slovenes.

Regardless of the merits of the Yugoslav case -- and the arguments concerning the logic of annexing Slovene Carinthia and the Styrian border areas had weight -- the chances that Yugoslavia might peaceably obtain the territory claimed were slight. In Moscow in 1943 the four major Allies had signed a declaration that called for the ultimate restoration of Austria to its pre-Anschluss borders. Although a signatory to this declaration the USSR nevertheless supported the case of Yugoslavia at this time and continued to do so until 1949 -- a year after Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform. Thereafter, seemingly as a result of its expulsion from the Satellite community, Yugoslavia adopted an increasingly conciliatory attitude toward the West in general and particularly toward Austria, which was receiving substantial support from the West. In 1951, Yugoslavia officially dropped its claims against Austria but retained the privilege of

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

championing the cause of the Slovenes whenever it was judged that the minority was being deprived of its rights. Since many Yugoslavs feel that Austria continues to discriminate against the Slovenes of Carinthia and Styria, the minority issue remains a live one.

Description of Carinthia

The area Yugoslavia had claimed consists, for the most part, of the Klagenfurt Basin and the adjacent slopes of the Karawank Mountains which lie to the south (see Map 28367, p.7). The Basin is triangular in shape, relatively flat, and rimmed on all sides by uplands, the highest and steepest of which are the Karawanks. In a few parts of the basin, however, are steep-sided river valleys and occasional hills that vary in size and form. The Karawank Mountains have a general east-west trend and constitute a natural barrier to contact between the people of Austrian Carinthia and those of the Yugoslav Peoples Republic of Slovenia, the northernmost republic of Yugoslavia. Easy communication between the two Slovene areas is possible only in the east, where two narrow valleys penetrate the Karawanks and nearby uplands.* Apart from the Klagenfurt Basin, Yugoslav post-World War II territorial claims also included (1) that part of the Gail Valley that opens into the basin from the west (an area remote from Yugoslavia) and (2) two small but relatively accessible sections of

* Although two or three roads cross over the crest of the Karawanks, they are impassable during the winter. The major route of communication between the Klagenfurt Basin and Yugoslavia is a 5-mile long railway tunnel through the mountains.

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Styria -- the border town of Radkersburg and territory to the north and another small border area to the west.

For centuries the Klagenfurt Basin was a focal area of mountain trade routes connecting lands to the north with those to the southwest. The town of Klagenfurt, in the middle of the basin, originated as a commercial center serving traders from many miles away. Later on, the basin was crisscrossed by international railroads and, still later, by long-distance truck routes. The basin also developed into a self-contained economic unit, as Klagenfurt attracted agricultural produce from its surroundings while fostering the development of more agricultural, mining, and industrial communities to serve it. Having been made the capital of Carinthia, Klagenfurt became not only the administrative center for the province but also the cultural center of the basin and many nearby valleys.

Population

During the centuries of major movements of peoples through this part of Europe, the Klagenfurt Basin was traversed by successive migrations of Kelts, Romans, Germans, Slavs, and other less important groups. Each migration left some of its members in the area. By A.D. 600 the ancestors of the modern Slovenes were probably the most numerous element of the population and the Germanic people were in the minority. Political control of this part of Europe, however, has been in the hands of Germanic rulers most of the time since then.


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By 1918 the German-speaking people who administered the area and who headed the important commercial organizations had acquired considerable control over the Slovene-speaking majority, and the necessity to deal with administrative officials and businessmen obliged the Slovenes to use German. Because the economic development of the basin attracted increasing numbers of German-speaking people from outside and the need for the Slovenes to use German was therefore greater, the number of persons speaking German increased significantly. This increase in the number of German-speaking inhabitants of Carinthia showed up in official records as a steady decrease in the Slovene population because many of the Austrian censuses taken after 1880, particularly the most recent census taken in 1951, recorded the language of normal daily usage (Umgangssprache) instead of the mother tongue. Even though a person were born of Slovene parents in a Slovene part of Carinthia and spoke Slovene in his home, he would register himself as German-speaking if he used German most of the time at his work. The truly Germanic elements in Carinthia, who have had no desire to preserve the ethnic character of the Slovene group, could easily bring social and economic pressures to bear against the Slovenes to make them register as German-speaking. A traditional dislike or, at best, a mere tolerance of Slavic peoples in general also has influenced official Austrian policies toward the Carinthian and Styrian Slovenes. Yugoslav authorities are convinced that the officially recorded decrease in the size of the Slovene element in

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Austria is due both to pressures on the part of the more powerful German-speaking people and to manipulation of the census data. Even though Yugoslavia admits an increase in the German-speaking population through immigration and a slight decrease in the Slovene population because of emigration, nevertheless that country is unable to accept the recorded diminution of the Austrian Slovenes from 101,000 in 1891 to about 7,000 in 1951 as an accurate natural decrease (see Map 28346, below).*



* According to Austrian documents the size of the Slovene minority varies from about 7,000 to 20,000. The smaller figure represents those who recorded themselves in the censuses as speaking only Slovene, and it is cited by most non-Slovene Austrians as the total number of Slovenes in Austria today. The larger figure includes those who listed themselves as speaking other than German only, and it is cited by most Austrian Slovenes as being more nearly accurate.

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The Slovenes are predominantly rural and generally live in relatively inaccessible areas. It is practically impossible to delimit "Slovene Carinthia" with any accuracy. In the first place, the definition of a "Slovene" is not agreed upon by Austrians, Yugoslavs, or even the Slovenes themselves. Secondly, the latest Austrian census provides no detailed figures that would allow a locational pinpointing of Slovenes and non-Slovenes. There is no physical distinction between them. Yugoslavs and Slovene leaders in Austria hold that on the basis of family background, place of birth (on what they consider ethnic Slovene territory), and language used in the home (mother tongue), almost 70,000 Slovenes live in Carinthia. The same spokesmen say that a characteristic type of farmhouse, a specific style of hay-drying rack, and a particular type of oven are of Slovene origin. These material objects are found in Slovenia and in Carinthia, where their distribution is said to coincide with the distribution of Slovenes in that province. Austrian authorities, however, maintain that these features are not necessarily of Slavic origin, but are traceable to a variety of past cultures. If the criteria of the Slavic spokesmen are accepted, the Austrian Slovenes occupy most of the area in which bilingual schools were established in 1945.

Schools


At the close of World War II, when Austria was in a precarious political and economic situation even though its territorial integrity

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was assured by the Moscow Declaration of 1943, one of the first matters discussed by the British-sponsored provisional government of Carinthia was the subject of bilingual education. This provisional government delimited the part of the province it believed to be bilingual in character and decreed that the elementary and secondary schools therein were thenceforth to use both German and Slovene as languages of instruction (see Map 28347, below).



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Slovene rights were also recognized in 1955 when the Austrian State Treaty was signed by the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France, and Austria. Article 6 of the Treaty deals with minority rights in general, and Article 7 specifically mentions the Slovenes of Carinthia. One of the paragraphs of Article 7 states that the Slovenes are entitled to elementary instruction in their own language and to a proportional number of their own secondary schools. Other paragraphs of Article 7 state that the Slovene language is acceptable for official purposes in areas where Slovene or mixed populations are found; that Slovenes are not to be excluded from cultural, administrative, and judicial systems in these areas; and that no organization with anti-Slovene aims shall be established.

The establishment of bilingual schools and the rights of minorities as cited in the Treaty contributed much to the assurance of Yugoslavia that the Carinthian Slovenes would be able to preserve their ethnic identity. The subsequent failure of Austria to provide teachers who were qualified to instruct in Slovene, however, was considered by Yugoslavia as evidence that the bilingual school system would not be fully implemented.

Many people in Austria were, in fact, opposed to compulsory bilingual education, arguing that very few genuine Slovene families were to be found in the so-called mixed-language area and that it was unreasonable to oblige the children of German-speaking families to learn a "foreign" tongue. These people cited the 1951 census figure

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of 7,000 Slovenes as proof of the sparsity of the Slovene population and maintained that parents should have the right to decide whether their children were to study Slovene. On the other hand, this principle of the Elternrecht was opposed by Yugoslavia, by Slovene leaders in Carinthia, and even by some non-Slovene Austrians. Dissatisfaction with the bilingual school system reached such proportions that not only local provincial leaders but also federal officials in Vienna were concerned with the issue. Eventually the question became not whether to revise the school system but how.

In September 1958 the governor of Carinthia decreed that parents who so desired could withdraw their children from bilingual education in favor of an all-German curriculum. Allegedly, this action was necessary to prevent disorders in the mixed-language region because parents in some areas had planned to strike in protest against compulsory instruction in Slovene (see Map 28347). As a result of the decree, about 80 percent of the school population dropped courses taught in Slovene although the decree by no means banned bilingual education. Another decree that attempted to clarify the situation by allowing students to reenter bilingual classes was issued soon after the first, but few took advantage of it. In March 1959 these provincial decrees that provided for optional (as opposed to compulsory) bilingual instruction were approved by the Austrian parliament.

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Current Situation and Prospects for the Future

The decrees of 1958 came as a surprise to Yugoslavia and were considered to be equivalent to the abolition of bilingual education. In protest, Yugoslavia withdrew its delegation from the Austro-Yugoslav conference then in session to deal with a variety of subjects, including the disposition of Austrian property in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia also sent a number of protesting notes to Austrian diplomatic authorities and decried the decision in both press and radio. Representatives of Carinthian Slovene organizations attempted to consult Austrian officials in Vienna but were not received. In time, however, the furor abated in spite of protests and even some suggestions on the part of Yugoslavia that the school decree could have "harmful consequences for neighborly relations between the two countries." Although the bilateral discussions that were terminated by Yugoslavia have not been resumed and Yugoslavia continues to maintain that bilingual education must be compulsory in order to safeguard the ethnic character of the Slovene minority, no further major protests have been made.

Austria has rejected Yugoslavia's protests on the grounds that the character of schools in Austria is of no concern to Yugoslavia and that the present school system is not only just but is also in complete compliance with the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty.

The magnitude of the Carinthian problem varies with one's point of view. To Slovenes in Austria and in Yugoslavia, the recorded

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decrease in the number of Carinthian Slovenes is the result of deliberate denationalization, and as such it ranks as a major crime against humanity. The official Yugoslav attitude, however, has changed along with the political fortunes of Yugoslavia. Its political estrangement from the Soviet Bloc undoubtedly helped tone down Yugoslavia's tirades against Austria, and its isolated position between East and West deters strong action. The ferocity of Yugoslavia's remonstrations against Austria over the school issue also may have been inspired, in part, by domestic political considerations. By the most liberal estimate the number of Slovenes in Carinthia does not exceed 70,000; and even though the Slovenes in Yugoslavia number some 1.5 million, they form less than 10 percent of the total population. Nevertheless, economically and culturally, the Peoples Republic of Slovenia has a leading position within the nation and often resents the authority of the central government. It is quite probable that by paying attention to an issue mainly concerning Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, Belgrade hopes to tie that republic more closely to the central government.

Most people in Austria do not recognize any real controversy, and believe that complaints of discrimination and denationalization originate in Ljubljana and are unfounded. On the other hand, some Austrians do believe that a minority problem exists; but even though they desire good relations with Yugoslavia, they can suggest no

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solution other than that provided by the 1958 decrees to a situation that involves many more Germanic Austrians than Slovenes.

Among the Slovenes in Carinthia, attitudes vary. Some want to identify themselves with Austria in every way, even to the point of denying that they are Slovenes; others want to preserve their Slovene character while remaining Austrian citizens; and a few desire closer ties or even union with Yugoslavia. Inasmuch as most of the Slovenes are Roman Catholic and inasmuch as the economic level of Austria is significantly higher than that of Communist Yugoslavia, an overwhelming majority of Carinthian Slovenes would, if polled in another plebiscite, choose to remain with Austria. Even those sections of Carinthia having a Slovene majority would probably opt to remain with Austria rather than accept the economic difficulties attendant upon union with Yugoslavia.

Although Yugoslavia expresses no irredentist ideas, it would certainly welcome the territorial acquisition of Slovene Carinthia. Failing to achieve such an unlikely goal, Yugoslavia nevertheless wants Austria to accede to the desires of Slovene leaders in matters concerning the welfare and education of the Slavic minority. In all probability, however, the school system in Carinthia will not be altered; and Yugoslavia will continue to protest and to take minor counteractions. If the present international climate continues, the issue of Slovene Carinthia will very likely diminish in importance

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since Yugoslavia can do little to halt the decrease in the recorded number of Slovenes -- whether due to an Austrian policy of denationalization or to natural changes. Political eventualities, however, could force Austria to revise its policies with regard to Carinthia. For example, should Austria bring the South Tirol issue before the United Nations, it would certainly have to reckon with a statement from Yugoslavia that Austria is demanding rights for a minority in another country but denies the same rights for a minority within its own borders. In order to avoid world criticism for such obviously contradictory policy, Austria might well be obliged to alter its attitude toward the Slovenes. Should the balance between East and West shift, however, and the USSR again espouse the Yugoslav cause, the entire Carinthian question might again emerge as an active dispute. In any case, future pro-Slovene actions taken by Austria will undoubtedly be motivated by external political considerations rather than by concern for the welfare of the Slovene minority.

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EXPANSION OF EAST GERMAN PORTS*

One of the top priority projects in East Germany today is the development of a large, new port complex at Petersdorf, on the Warnow Estuary near Rostock, capable of handling about 22 million tons of traffic annually. Of equal priority is the expansion of existing facilities at Rostock, Warnemünde, Wismar, and Stralsund (see Map 28427, following p. 33).

Although the percentage of East German seaborne trade carried in East German vessels has risen significantly in recent years and the expansion of port facilities is closely allied to the increase in size of the East German fleet, this discussion is limited to the port development program. In spite of the recent rise in maritime trade and the efforts of East Germany to direct a major portion of it to other Bloc countries and the Near East, Far East, and Africa, foreign vessels probably will continue to carry most of the East German trade. It is estimated that by 1965 only 17 to 20 percent of the total will be carried by East German vessels even though most of the commodities will be shipped through East German ports.

The need for improved port facilities has developed in accordance with the planned expansion of the economy of East Germany and the changing functions of East German ports over a long period of time.

* Data in text and tables are taken from current US intelligence documents and open literature published in East Germany.

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The Changing Functions of the East German Ports

The ports of Rostock, Wismar, and Stralsund were great ports in the days of the Hanseatic League. As recently as the mid-nineteenth century they teemed with merchant ships. In 1870, 378 ships operated out of Rostock -- only 100 less than out of Hamburg. The changes in the world trade patterns in the next 20 years, however, were catastrophic for the three ports. Whereas in the early nineteenth century the Baltic had been a center of sea traffic, it was now a backwater in world maritime patterns. An aging trade organization with insufficient capital to convert from small vessels to large steamships lost its main source of income -- charter hauling to foreign ports; channel depths were insufficient to permit utilization of the ports by large ships from other ports; and the agricultural hinterland with a relatively small, widely dispersed population did not provide a market sufficient to warrant the development of an import trade. Exports were mainly agricultural and therefore seasonal, and the transport facilities serving areas inland from the ports were not sufficiently developed to generate other trade. Instead, the hinterland was served by the Elbe, with its outlet at Hamburg, and by the Oder, with its outlet at Szczecin (Stettin). Thus Rostock, Wismar, and Stralsund lost their position as big ports to other cities that were better located. With the 1934 prohibition on the export of grain, they were finally relegated to the rank of local ports.

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The political changes in this area as a consequence of World War II caused many economic-geographic factors to be realigned. Newly established boundaries isolated East Germany from the ports upon which she was dependent, but plans for the industrial development of the country required a constantly expanding trade through these same ports. About 2 million tons of freight now move through Hamburg annually and some tonnage moves through Szczecin because the present port facilities of East Germany are not capable of handling the imports and exports of the region. The use of foreign ports is both politically and financially repugnant to East German planners, and their dependence upon Hamburg seriously aggravates East Germany's foreign exchange difficulties.

Table 1* shows that the tonnage handled in East German ports has grown considerably since 1936 and that, although they are still far behind Hamburg and even Lübeck, both Wismar and Rostock have surpassed Kiel. The East German ports, however, are approaching their maximum development; and if East Germany succeeds in its ambitious industrial development plans, the need for more port facilities will increase.

* Table 1 follows on p. 22.

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Table 1

Cargo Handled
by Selected West German and East German Ports
1936 and 1958

	Metric Tons	
	1936	1958
Kiel	600,000	800,000
Lübeck	3,000,000	3,100,000
Hamburg	31,100,000	33,100,000
Wismar	214,700	1,696,000
Rostock	421,700	901,100
Stralsund	226,900	665,800

The types of cargo handled in East German ports also changed considerably in the postwar period. In the past, all three ports were quiet much of the year and came to life only for a short period after harvest. Grain and sugar made up 80 to 90 percent of the exports; and coal, wood, granite, and marble were the chief imports. This pattern of commodities was not surprising in view of the historical relationship between port and hinterland. Now the hinterland has expanded to include all of East Germany, and very likely an increasing proportion of Czechoslovakia's seaborne trade will use these ports in the future. They are no longer chiefly ports of export, the import totals being much greater than the export. Grain, formerly the chief export, is now imported through all ports; and the types of commodities handled are considerably more varied.

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Wismar, particularly, is significant for the variety of its imports. Petroleum, petroleum derivatives, apatite, grain, coal, and coke predominate, but large quantities of cotton, peanuts, tobacco, tropical fruit, and canned goods are also handled. Exports are primarily potash, other fertilizer salts, and sodium phosphate. Rostock imports coal, ore, metals, grain, and lumber and exports high-grade piece goods, including complete factory installations as well as machinery and tools. Stralsund imports fish, lumber, and iron and exports briquettes and rock salt.

Table 2* provides some idea of the actual and projected growth of East German ports. It is expected that by 1961 Stralsund will have reached its maximum development, and Rostock and Wismar will have approached theirs. Further development will be concentrated at Petersdorf. By 1967, Petersdorf should provide 75 to 80 percent of East Germany's total port capacity if the project is not phased back.

Factors of political prestige and socialist economics have led East Germany to bold planning for the development of its own "World Port." Immediately after the war, considerable investment was put into the development of Wismar; but it was decided that the maximum development potential at Wismar would not meet the East German requirements, and the selection of a site was narrowed down to one

* Table 2 follows on p. 24.

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Table 2
Trade and Projected Capacities of East German Ports
1936-61

Year	Rostock		Wismar		Stralsund		Petersdorf a/		Total
	Metric Tons	Percent	Metric Tons	Percent	Metric Tons	Percent	Metric Tons	Percent	
1936	421,700	48.8	214,700	24.9	226,900	26.3	0	0	863,300
1955	703,500	30.0	969,500	41.3	668,900	28.5	0	0	2,341,900
1958	901,100	27.6	1,696,000	51.9	665,800	20.4	0	0	3,262,900
1961	1,500,000	20.0	2,000,000	33.0	1,000,000	15.0	1,500,000	20.0	6,000,000
		to	to	to	to	to	to	to	to
		25.0	3,000,000	43.0		17.0		25.0	7,000,000

a. The port of Petersdorf did not exist in 1936, 1955, or 1958. 1960 is scheduled as the first year it will be in operation.

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on the Warnow Estuary. The development of added facilities at the old port of Rostock was ruled out because of its distance from the Baltic and the limited room for expansion. The outer port of Warnemünde and a site on the Baltic shore opposite Warnemünde were also rejected. The site finally selected was on Der Breitling, an embayment of the Warnow Estuary. An extensive meadow area near Petersdorf, directly south of Warnemünde, was judged to be suitable for the development of a port. It had protected waters and yet was only a very short distance* from the open Baltic, an important prerequisite for a fast port. It also was close to the Warnow Shipyard, which is constructing large vessels for the new East German fleet and which could serve as a repair facility. After several plans were alternately accepted and rejected the basic plan that is now taking shape evolved.

The major problem of a small entrance channel that was inadequate for projected tonnage was solved by dredging a new channel immediately east of it and relegating the old channel to the status of an outer port for Warnemünde that would be capable of handling six to eight ships at a time and have an annual capacity of 500,000 tons. The new channel is designed to accommodate 10,000-ton vessels. It has a depth of 10.5 meters and a bottom width of 60 meters. The width

* Only 6.8 kilometers between roadstead and quays compared to Hamburg's 120 and Bremen's 110 kilometers from the North Sea.

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of the fairway surface varies from 180 to 200 meters, increasing seaward to approximately 250 meters, and in addition there is a turning basin 1,000 meters long by 240 meters wide.

The original plans for the new port at Petersdorf called for three basins, but revised plans include only two basins with space for a possible third. As planned, each wharf will be functionally specialized, will be outfitted with the devices necessary for rapid loading and unloading of ships, and will have adequate warehousing and railroad facilities. A separate oil port is underway on an adjacent site. Additional facilities also are planned for the established ports of Rostock and Warnemünde. Eventually the program will develop a three-port complex on the Lower Warnow with an annual throughput capacity of 16 million tons at Petersdorf and 6 million tons at the oil port as well as 1.5 million to 2 million tons at the old ports.

Connections with the Interior

The success of the port plan will depend in large part on the energy devoted to developing inland transport facilities. For more than a hundred years, plans for canals connecting Baltic ports with inland waterways have been considered recurrently. One such plan, having several possible routes between Wismar and the Elbe, was revived in 1956 when it seemed that Wismar was to be East Germany's "World Port."* The proposed canal route from Wittenberge to Wismar

* See "Proposed East German Elbe-Baltic Canal," Geographic Intelligence Review, CIA/RR MR-51, January 1957, C.

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via the Stör Canal and the Schweriner See had official sanction until the "World Port" was moved to the Rostock area. Then the Wismar-Elbe plan was abruptly shelved, and a number of inland water routes to Rostock assumed prominence. Two routes -- one connecting Rostock with the Elbe via the Warnow and various water links through Crivitz, Parchim, and Wittenberge and the other connecting Rostock with the Oder via a new canal from Der Breitling to Saaler Bodden, the Rechnitz, the Trebel, and the Peene -- were to be constructed (see Map 28427). Some work on the new canal of the second route was actually started, but reportedly it has come to a halt. Work on the first reportedly is awaiting aerial-photo coverage for engineering studies. Even if given top priority now, some years of work and a considerable outlay of funds would be required before inland waterways could serve the port adequately.

Most of the plans advanced for a canal system utilize portions of old canals and thereby place limitations on the size of vessels and the over-all capacity of the system. Factors weighing against the construction of a canal network adequate for current and projected needs include (1) the heavy requirement for earth-moving equipment, (2) the need for thousands of hours of "volunteered" hand labor, (3) the competition for priority in obtaining labor, (4) the favorable apportioning of equipment and materials in over-all East German planning, (5) the length of time required to complete a canal system,

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and (6) the staggering cost and long amortization period in comparison to that required for railroad facilities.

Plans for land transport are based heavily on rail facilities. Both improved facilities at the port and better inland connections have been stressed in plans for the development of good rail transport. The new port at Petersdorf will have its own terminal and switch yards, sidings on the wharves, and enough mechanical handling equipment for rapid transfer of cargo directly to rail cars. The obstruction of traffic in the town center of Rostock, which is caused by the old harbor line, will be eliminated by new terminal and yard facilities and by a bypass line.

Rostock at present has single-track main lines leading west to Schwerin, east to Stralsund, and south to Güstrow and Berlin. In an attempt to increase the capacity of the rail net, some activity has been directed toward the restoration of the Lalendorf-Waren-Neustrelitz line and the second track of the Berlin-Neustrelitz section of the line to Stralsund, both of which were dismantled after World War II. Such restoration operations could proceed at a rapid pace if given priority and should be considerably cheaper than building waterways.

Improvements in the road network include bypasses of Rostock for long-distance traffic, better roads to Warnemünde, a good road to the new port area at Petersdorf, and, it is rumored, a Rostock-Berlin

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autobahn. It seems likely that the improved rail net supplemented by improved highways could handle the traffic generated by the new port complex.

Existing Ports

Present Condition and Proposed Development

Wismar: The port of Wismar is located in the innermost part of a deeply indented and well-protected estuary. It is functionally divided into the old port, a shipyard basin, an overseas basin, and a fertilizer and petroleum harbor. In order to equip the port for overseas trade in the era immediately after the war, the main channel was deepened from 6 to 9.5 meters and depths were increased to 7 to 10 meters in the overseas basin and Kalihafen (fertilizer harbor), and transshipment facilities were developed. It is planned that ultimately Wismar will specialize in general cargo traffic with China and Indonesia and in handling potash and oil.

Before World War II, Wismar did not handle petroleum, potash, or other salts. The assignment of this function to the port required developing the old industrial basin into the Kalihafen equipped with a freight switching yard and with dumping, storage, and loading facilities. The oil installations north of the Kalihafen permit the unloading of oil from tankers of up to 10,000 deadweight tons (DWT) into freight cars in a very short time. Other improvements designed to increase capacity include the new grain elevators on the southern

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side of the overseas basin. These elevators are equipped with suction devices permitting the rapid transfer of large quantities of grain.

Rostock-Warnemünde: The main port of Rostock is located about 10 kilometers from the mouth of the Warnow. The river bed is more than half a mile wide in places and is shallow and sandy. In 1956 the channel was deepened from 6 to 7 meters. Further deepening, improvement of the quays, and extension of the port facilities has been accomplished since then. In contrast to most large overseas ports, Rostock has been functionally divided to only a slight extent, but a partial division of labor between Rostock and Warnemünde has been necessary because of the differences in depths of the harbors and available freight-handling equipment. Ships of large draft frequently unload enough of their cargo in Warnemünde to permit negotiating the channel and then proceed to Rostock, where the turnaround time is shortened by more efficient handling equipment. Items such as foodstuffs, however, are frequently transferred to the railroad or to warehouses at Warnemünde. In terms of the length of existing quays, warehouse capacities, and labor-saving mechanical devices, the proportion of the total transit trade that is handled in Warnemünde is high -- largely because it is located on the Baltic and because, until 1956, its harbor was deeper than the one at Rostock. Warnemünde's share of the transit trade declined in recent years. In the national plan for ports, Rostock is to specialize in traffic with other European countries and the Levant and in traffic carried by ships

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of less than 5,000-ton capacity. Plans call for a further improvement in capacity variously reported to be from 1 million to 1.5 million tons or from 1.5 million to 2 million tons annually.

The Warnemünde-Gedser, Denmark, ferry service has not regained its pre-World War II status as a competitor of the Sassnitz-Trelleborg, Sweden, ferry. It now handles traffic between Denmark and East Germany and some of the other Satellites but is stagnating at a level of about 100,000 tons per year.

Stralsund: Stralsund's location offers the advantage of a protected harbor with extensive inland-waterway connections. It has two disadvantages, however, that are likely to limit its growth: (1) location on a part of the coast where silt deposition is a major problem and constant dredging is required, and (2) a restrictive urban pattern in which the port is completely surrounded by built-up areas, making major redevelopment of the town necessary if port facilities are to be extended. The port is normally used only by small craft (up to 1,000 DWT) that originate in countries bordering on the Baltic. Most of the traffic is handled through the entrance from the west because it is much shorter, but the western channel is only about 5 meters deep and needs constant dredging. The entrance from the east is 6 meters deep but requires much longer to navigate. Plans to improve and shorten the east entrance to the Stralsund harbor were apparently shelved when it was decided to make Rostock a deep sea port.

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Minor Ports: East Germany has a number of minor ports, some of which have been developed or altered considerably since 1945. Sassnitz perhaps has been changed more than any other minor port. The Sassnitz-Trelleborg ferry has doubled its pre-World War II trade, and both Sweden and East Germany are making plans for its continued growth. Before 1945 the ferry basins and associated rail terminal and switching yards were the most conspicuous features of the port, although the loading facilities for shipping chalk also were a prominent part of the port area. About 200,000 tons of chalk were exported in the 1930's; but the primary market, the Portland cement works at the mouth of the Oder, was lost as a result of the new boundaries and no new market has been found. The chalk facilities have been dismantled to make way for a large fishing combine. Now the processing plant and the fishing boats are the most outstanding features of the port.

Plans to improve Griefswald, Wolgast, and other small ports have apparently been modified considerably in favor of the concentration of efforts at Petersdorf.

Conclusion

The planned development at Petersdorf of a port with a capacity of 6 million tons of oil and 16 million tons of other cargo over and above the capacity of the old ports nearby probably is technically feasible. The likelihood of achieving this goal, however, depends upon the success or failure of plans for developing the industries

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of the hinterland. For example, if the pipeline from the USSR to Schwedt is completed, the need for so much oil-handling capacity at Petersdorf may be questioned. Just as the three basins that were called for in the preliminary plans were cut back to two, so is it possible that the construction of warehouses and handling facilities at these two basins may be reduced if the estimate of the growth of trade turns out to be overly optimistic.


The development of a port complex on the Warnow Estuary brings up strategic as well as economic factors. It would provide the Soviet navy with an advance base much closer to the Atlantic than its other Baltic ports -- a significant asset. The space available in Der Breitling is adequate for the development of naval projects similar to the large submarine base in Grösser Jasmunder Bodden on Rügen, initiated in 1952 but not worked on after June 1953. Whereas it is unlikely that the present naval facilities at Marienehe, across Der Breitling from Petersdorf, will attain the dramatic proportions of those planned for Rügen, it seems probable that they will continue to expand. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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
EAST GERMANY PORTS AND INLAND ACCESS ROUTES



- Selected railroad
- Selected road
- Selected canal
- Proposed canal route

0 20 40 60
Statute Miles
0 20 40 60
Kilometers

CONFIDENTIAL



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THE POPULATION OF CYPRUS

Data on the population of Cyprus, serving in lieu of a regular decennial census, were made available as a result of the registration in October 1956 of all persons 12 years of age or older. Although these data reveal few changes in the previous basic patterns of the distribution, composition, and growth of the population, they point up several features that are of significance in relation to the plan to establish an independent two-community state of Cyprus.

The total population of the island increased from 450,114 in 1946 to an estimated 528,618 in 1956, an increase of 17.4 percent for the decade, or an average annual rate of increase of about 1.6 percent. This rate of increase is somewhat higher than the world average and considerably higher than that for Western Europe but is slightly smaller than the Cyprus average during the intercensal period 1931-46. The distribution of population by ethnic communities at selected dates is shown in Table 1.*

In view of the fact that the membership of the House of Representatives under the new government of Cyprus as provided in the Zurich-London Accords of 18 February 1959 is to be 70 percent Greek and 30 percent Turkish, it is interesting to note that about 79 percent

* Table 1 follows on p. 36.

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of the population belongs to the Greek community and 17 percent to the Turkish, the remaining 4 percent (classed as "other" in Table 1) being composed of minor communities such as the British, Armenian, and Maronite.

Table 1

Distribution of Population of Cyprus
by Ethnic Communities
1881-1956 a/

Date	All Communities	Greeks		Turks		Other	
	Total	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
1881	186,173	137,631	73.9	45,458	24.4	3,084	1.7
1931	347,959	276,572	79.5	64,245	18.5	7,142	2.0
1946	450,114	361,199	80.3	80,548	17.9	8,367	1.8
1956 b/	528,618	417,199	78.9	92,163	17.4	19,256	3.7

a. All figures from [Cyprus] Statistical Section, Financial Secretary's Office, Cyprus: Registration of the Population, 1956, [Nicosia, 1958].

b. All 1956 figures are estimated.

The proportion of Turks to the total population has steadily declined since the first British census was taken in 1881. Although the rate of growth of the Turkish community has been less than that of the Greek, the difference between the two rates of growth has tended to decrease in recent decades. In the 1946-56 period the average annual rate for Turks was about 1.4 percent whereas it was about 1.5 for Greeks.

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The considerable influx of non-Cypriot (mainly British) elements into Cyprus in recent years is reflected in Table 1. Although the proportion of minor communities to the total population was still small in 1956, it had increased markedly over 1946, chiefly at the expense of the Greek element. Among the minor communities the British numbered 7,748; the Armenians, 4,549; the Maronites, 2,445; and other unspecified groups, 3,216.

Urban growth has been marked in recent decades. Of the three largest towns, Nicosia (81,741) had a growth of more than 50 percent in the decade and Limassol (36,536) and Famagusta (26,763) each increased more than 60 percent. Table 2* indicates the distribution of the total population between urban and rural areas in 1946 and 1956 and urban and rural growth during this period.

Over a long period the townward migration from the countryside has affected the Greek community more than the Turkish. In 1881, when the Greek community comprised 73.9 percent of the total for Cyprus, it made up only 57.4 percent of the town population, whereas in 1956 the percentages were 78.9 and 69.0, respectively. The proportion of Turks in the urban areas decreased from 36.9 percent to 20.9 percent during the same period. Nevertheless, in the last intercensal decade, the urbanization of Turks in two towns, Famagusta and Larnaca, progressed rapidly. The urban ratio in the minor ethnic communities has also increased greatly in recent years.

* Table 2 follows on p. 38.

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Table 2

Population of Cyprus
1946 and 1956 a/

Year	Urban		Rural	
	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total
1946	115,808	25.7	334,306	74.3
1956	173,870 b/	33.4	347,462 b/	66.6
				3.9

a. Data from [Cyprus Census Office], Cyprus: Census of Population and Agriculture, 1946, [London, 1949] and [Cyprus] Statistical Section, Financial Secretary's Office, Cyprus: Registration of Population, 1956, [Nicosia, 1958]. Urban areas include the six towns that are district centers and the suburban villages adjoining Nicosia. The rural population lives mainly in villages ranging in size from less than 50 to more than 3,000.

b. Excluding persons exempted from registration and their proportionate number of children under 12, or a total of 7,286 whose place of residence was not recorded.

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The community composition and the rate of growth of the communities vary considerably from town to town. Data for the five principal towns are given in Table 3,* and the 1956 community composition of all the towns is shown graphically on Map 28366.** Of the five towns, Limassol and Famagusta have the highest proportions of Greeks among their inhabitants, Nicosia and Larnaca somewhat smaller proportions, and Paphos the smallest proportion. Between 1946 and 1956 the rate of increase of Turks in Famagusta and Larnaca, was greater than that of Greeks -- an exception to the general rule. As a result the proportion of Turks in Famagusta in 1956 remained the same as it had been 10 years before and in Larnaca the proportion increased. In the three other principal towns, however, the growth rate for Turks was lower than that for Greeks; and in Paphos, where in the past the Turkish minority has been stronger than in the other towns, the growth rate of the Greek community was more than twice that of the Turkish.

It is planned that under the new regime these five towns will be physically partitioned and have separate Greek and Turkish municipalities. These provisions, however, will be reviewed after a period of 4 years. If present growth trends continue, it appears that the Greek element in the towns will continue to be predominant. In Paphos the Greeks will become even more predominant, whereas in Famagusta and Larnaca the Greek predominance will decline somewhat.

* Table 3 follows on p. 40.

** Map 28366 follows p. 41.

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Table 3

Ethnic Composition and Percentage of Increase of Population
of Five Towns on Cyprus
1946-56 a/

Town	Year	Ethnic Communities								
		Total Population			Greek			Turkish		
		Number	Growth from 1946 to 1956 (Percent)	Number	Percent of Total	Growth from 1946 to 1956 (Percent)	Number	Percent of Total	Growth from 1946 to 1956 (Percent)	Other
Nicosia	1946	53,324	53.3	37,589	70.5	51.1	12,055	22.6	36.2	3,680
	1956	81,741		56,794	69.5		16,414	20.1		
Limasol	1946	22,799	60.3	18,811	82.5	55.4	3,459	15.2	42.6	529
	1956	36,536		29,229	80.0		4,932	13.5		
Famagusta	1946	16,194	65.3	13,106	80.9	55.8	2,699	16.7	65.7	389
	1956	26,763		20,413	76.3		4,473	16.7		
Larnaca	1946	14,772	20.9	10,605	71.8	17.6	2,928	19.8	23.3	1,239
	1956	17,867		12,471	69.8		3,609	20.2		
Paphos	1946	5,803	25.5	3,617	62.4	31.5	2,147	36.9	14.6	39
	1956	7,283		4,758	65.3		2,460	33.8		
										65
										6.9
										10.4
										2.3
										6.5
										2.4
										7.0
										8.4
										10.0
										0.7
										0.9

a. Data from [Cyprus Census Office], Cyprus: Census of Population and Agriculture, 1946, [London, 1949] and [Cyprus] Statistical Section, Financial Secretary's Office, Cyprus: Registration of Population, 1956, [Nicosia, 1958].

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
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Much of the increase in population in Nicosia is accounted for by suburban growth. The central town had a population of 48,864 in 1956, a 41.7 percent increase over 1946, whereas the nine suburban villages had 32,877, an increase of 74.5 percent during the same decade. The central town contains most of the Turks, British, Armenians, and other non-Greek elements of the population, the Greeks comprising only 57 percent of the total. In the suburbs, by contrast, the Greek community accounts for 88 percent of the total. A somewhat similar situation prevails in Famagusta, where the old town is mainly Turkish; and Varosha, the newer portion, is predominantly Greek. The published 1956 data, however, do not permit an analysis of the subdivisions of towns other than Nicosia.



The map accompanying this article is designed to give a more complete and current picture of the distribution of ethnic communities on Cyprus than is shown on earlier maps. In preparing the map, which indicates the distribution and the ethnic character of villages, a village was considered to fall in one ethnic group if three-fourths or more of its population belonged to that group. If more than one-fourth of the population of a village consisted of one or more minority groups the village was placed in the "mixed" category. Map 28366 also indicates the relative size and ethnic composition of the towns and the actual size and ethnic composition of the total rural population of each district. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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URBAN POPULATION




RURAL (VILLAGE) POPULATION BY DISTRICT



CYPRUS

ETHNIC COMMUNITIES - 1956



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POSTWAR MAP OF INLAND WATERWAYS OF THE USSR

The recent acquisition of a 1955 map of inland waterways of the USSR, Skhema Vodnykh Putey SSSR, helps fill a need for postwar information on navigable rivers and canals in the Soviet Union. The map was published by the USSR Ministry of the River Fleet (Ministerstvo Rechnogo Flota SSSR; MRF)* as an aid for computing freight charges, but its principal intelligence value lies in the detailed coverage on the extent of navigability and the location of ports and anchorage points along Soviet rivers. Although published in 1955, the map is still the only comprehensive Soviet source on inland waterways that is available.

On this wall map, the western part of the USSR (European USSR and the Urals) is shown at a scale of approximately 1:3,000,000, whereas the eastern part of the country (Asiatic USSR) is at approximately 1:5,000,000. Rivers and sections of rivers having regular navigation service are differentiated by symbols from those having only irregular service. Ports and landings or anchorage stops along the various inland waterways are shown, and freight tariff points of

* The map was compiled by the Scientific-Editorial Map-Compilation Section of G.U.G.K. (Chief Administration of Geodesy and Cartography), and was printed at the Novosibirsk Map Factory. A black and white reproduction is available in the CIA Map Library under Call No. 117671. The original map in color is available in the Library of Congress Map Division under Call No. G 7001 .P5 1955 .R8.

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the Ministry of the River Fleet are specifically identified. Distances on which tariff rates are based are given between selected ports or landings along various rivers. These tariff-rate points are differentiated from other stops along the routes by clearly distinguishable symbols. Geographic distances along rivers, across lakes, and on the Aral Sea are given in kilometers, but the distances along maritime shipping lanes -- including the Northern Sea Route -- are given in nautical miles.

In connection with river-navigation data, the map provides additional related information of considerable interest. Particularly significant are (1) the location of transshipment points for river-to-rail and river-to-maritime traffic, (2) the location of timber-raft assembly points, and (3) the location of hydroelectric centers, both existing and under construction. Other transportation data shown include railroads and railroad ferries, principal roads, maritime shipping lanes and ports, as well as the administrative centers of both maritime and river navigation.

Some of the more significant or congested inland waterways of the USSR are shown in greater detail on nine large-scale insets. The insets, which include many river ports and anchorage places that are not located on the main map, cover the following areas: (1) the Neva River between Leningrad and Lake Ladoga, (2) the estuaries of the Western Dvina and the Liyelupe Rivers, (3) the estuary of the Neman River, (4) the Moscow river and canal system, (5) the Rybinsk

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Reservoir, (6) the Volga Delta, (7) the lower courses of the Dnepr and Bug Rivers, (8) the middle and lower course of the Amur, and (9) a part of the middle course of the Ob'.

Two Soviet long-distance maritime routes with regular service that skirt the European and Asiatic continents are also shown in separate insets. One inset, Zapadnyy Morskoy Marshrut (Western Sea Route), illustrates shipping lanes from Murmansk and Leningrad to Odessa, with stops at London (or Kiel, if originating from Leningrad), Lisbon, Gibraltar, Piraeus, and Istanbul. Another inset, the Yuzhnyy Morskoy Marshrut (Southern Sea Route), shows the connection between Odessa and Vladivostok via Istanbul, Port Said, Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Canton, and Shanghai. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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with Chinese atlases), and extremely well printed in a range of colors that presents the data clearly. In general, it is the best contemporary atlas produced on China, being inferior to the best pre-Communist atlas (the 1934 V. K. Ting atlas) only in having fewer place names and no hsien boundaries.

The heart of the atlas consists of 8 regional maps at scales of 1:6,000,000 and smaller, and 20 provincial maps at scales of either 1:3,000,000 or 1:4,000,000. In addition, 4 inset maps at scales of 1:1,500,000 and smaller provide coverage of key areas -- Peking-Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, and the Szechwan Basin. The regional maps of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, and the South China Sea are the only maps included for these large and sparsely populated areas; each of the other four regional maps covers several provinces. These maps are intended to show the major terrain features and drainage patterns unencumbered by the mass of cultural detail included on the larger scale maps of individual provinces.

The provincial maps present much useful physical data.* For areas of lower elevation, relief is shown by a combination of layer tinting and contours drawn at elevations of 50, 200, and 500 meters

* Since the atlas sheets predate the 1:4,000,000 Physical Map of China compiled by and issued under the auspices of the Academia Sinica in January 1958, the more recent map (within the limitations of its scale) is the more authoritative as a reference for physical detail. It is available at the CIA Map Library under Call Number 27228.

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A NEW CHINESE COMMUNIST ATLAS

Analysts concerned with Communist China have long awaited the appearance of a good general reference atlas of Chinese Communist origin. Although numerous small atlases have been published periodically in China since 1951, the terrain, hydrography, and other basic data depicted usually have been highly generalized and, in some cases, of questionable reliability; and most of the special-subject maps included in the atlases have not incorporated post-1949 data. Apparently the Chinese also felt the need for an up-to-date atlas, since in 1957 the semiofficial Ti-tu Ch'u-pan She (Map Publishing Company) published the Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Ti-t'u-chi (Atlas of the People's Republic of China).* As stated in the preface to this atlas, its purpose is "to supply contemporary intellectuals and cadres of middle school cultural level ... with ... a reference for work and study."

This is an entirely new atlas with newly compiled provincial sheets and special-subject maps. The size (about 7-3/4 by 10-1/2 inches) is compact and convenient; it is well bound (a feature that can be fully appreciated only by those who have had long experience

* Unfortunately, only one copy of this atlas is available, for reference use only, in the CIA Map Library under Call Number aH420 .T 585, 1957. A number of black and white photocopy reproductions are available on indefinite loan.

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above sea level; 500-meter contour intervals are used for elevations between 500 and 2,000 meters; and 1,000-meter intervals for higher areas. The hydrography appears to be fairly complete and accurately drawn -- a pleasant change from the uniformly "wiggly" stream alignments decorating the maps included in previous Chinese atlases.

A wealth of cultural detail is also portrayed on the provincial maps. Although the compilation cutoff date of late 1956 lessens the value of transportation and administrative data to some extent, these maps are extremely useful as sources of information on alignments of railroads and roads. International frontiers are portrayed in the manner customary since late 1953, showing areas of Burma, India, Bhutan, and Kashmir as part of China. Provincial boundaries show evidence of careful drafting that in part reflects the accurate hydrographic and terrain data used in compilation of the province sheets. The provincial maps also comprise the most authoritative source available on the alignment of autonomous chou boundaries. Unlike the earlier atlases which used symbols to indicate administrative subordination of cities, the 1957 atlas indicates such subordination by type of different sizes -- a device that makes it somewhat difficult to locate hsien seats quickly or to obtain an impression of their distribution. Symbols, however, are effectively used to indicate the size of populated places. Although urban population data are presented in 7 categories of size, the most

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useful category is that for towns of 5,000 to 20,000 -- a population range for which statistics are seldom available.

The atlas includes several special-subject maps covering all of China, mostly at the scale of 1:18,000,000. In general, these maps incorporate the results of recent research and are tentatively evaluated as the best available at their respective scales. All of the special-subject maps are impressive examples of cartographic skill in combining color and symbols to portray numerous categories and complex patterns of data. The most useful of the maps are those on geology, climate, soils, vegetation, population density, and ethnic groups.* The map of climatic regions is of particular interest because it represents an effort to delimit more meaningful climatic divisions of China by integrating elements of the Köppen and Thornthwaite systems of climatic classification with existing data on physical and agricultural regions. China is divided into 7 climatic regions and 26 subregions, with supporting temperature-rainfall charts given for 28 representative stations. Although the special-subject maps of the Communist atlas are superior to similar ones in earlier atlases, most of the older atlases included maps of crop distribution,

* Available at the CIA Map Library are the maps showing population density (Call Number 55565) and distribution of ethnic groups (Call Number 102053) at the relatively large and very usable scale of 1:4,000,000. The population map was discussed in the Geographic Intelligence Review, MR-56, December 1958.

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agricultural regions, location of mineral deposits, major industrial areas, and city plans that do not appear in the new one.

A place-name index is appended, with names listed alphabetically according to the romanization of a Chinese phonetics system that resembles but is not entirely identical with the new phonetic (Pinyin) spelling recently adopted by Peking. Some familiarity with the Chinese language is needed to use this index, which contains about 17,500 entries. By comparison, 34,000 names are indexed in the V. K. Ting atlas.

One of the interesting aspects of the 1957 atlas is the use of Soviet materials and techniques. The physical and cultural symbols used on the Chinese maps and the layout of legend pages are in most cases identical with those in Soviet atlases. Plates of the Soviet Atlas Mira were used in compiling the maps for Tibet, Sinkiang, Northeast China, and areas adjoining China. The general appearance of the atlas confirms a prefatory note which states that the compilation was done "under the spirit of combined study of progressive Soviet map-making theory and experience, and experience inherited from Chinese map-making." (UNCLASSIFIED)

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